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In language, information is omitted for brevity. Comprehension requires
inferences to be made, but do we make such inferences during encoding or later? Kintsch
(1988) claimed that transitive inferences are made during reading and proposed transitive
inferences are extracted from a constructed mental image.
Two experiments were performed to test his ideas. Participants read sentences
permitting a transitive or reciprocal inference, then immediately answered an inference
based question. Data included reaction time and accuracy. By comparing verification
against inferential sentences, it is possible to determine if the inference is made during
encoding or later. A further manipulation was to compare concrete sentences that could
be easily converted to an image with abstract sentences that are hard to image.
Results showed reciprocal sentences are slower to verify than transitive,
suggesting additional processing is needed. In contrast, no difference was observed
between concrete and abstract relations, calling into question Kintsch’s inference/image
view.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Inferences are made during reading to connect concepts together whose
connections are not explicitly stated in the text. These inferences may be constructed
while reading or sometime after reading such as when asked a question about the text.
Kintsch (1998) points out the need for inferences during comprehension especially
whenever information is not directly stated or made explicit. These inferences connect
concepts or propositions/ideas together to form a coherent structure. Clearly, such
inferential processing requires additional cognitive processes beyond those required to
parse the linguistic input.
The additional inferential processing may be either automatic or controlled
(Kintsch, 1998). Automatic inferences may be performed concurrently with other
activities such as reading. Controlled inferences demand attention and must be performed
separately from other activities. Since controlled inferences may not be made while
reading, the processes used to make controlled inferences will either delay reading or
occur after reading. If a controlled inference was needed for comprehending a passage,
reading would pause until the processes behind the controlled inference concluded. Also,
if a controlled inference was needed to answer a question about the passage, the
processes that formulate the controlled inference would only fire once the inference was
needed.
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Kintsch (1988) claims that transitive inferences can be made automatically and
concurrently with ongoing reading/parsing activities. He further asserts that the basis of
this automatic processing is the formation of an image that represents the transitive
relationships expressed in the linguistic input. Consider the example sentence The Seattle
Space Needle is shorter than the Eiffel Tower, which is shorter than the Empire State
Building. The transitive inference would be The Seattle Space Needle is shorter than the
Empire State Building. An image with the three structures may have them lined up in a
row to illustrate how their heights relate to one another. The order of the structures may
even be imaged lowest to highest or vice versa. Kintsch does not explicitly state how the
image would be ‘read,’ but an inference about the three structures could be verified by
comparing the imagined heights of the buildings.
Kintsch utilizes Bransford, Barclay, and Franks’s (1972) study as evidence for
transitive inferences relying upon mental images. In their study, Bransford et al. wanted
to see if participants remembered a spoken sentence word-for-word or if they
remembered the meaning of the sentence but not the specific words. To test the two
theories, participants went through two different phases: acquisition and recognition.
During the acquisition phase participants were told to listen carefully to 21 sentences
spoken by the experimenter because they would be asked questions about the sentences
later. Participants had a three-minute break between acquisition and recognition. The
recognition phase consisted of participants listening to the experimenter read sentences
aloud again; participants were tasked with indicating which sentences they had heard and
which they had not heard during the acquisition phase.
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Table 1

Example of Bransford, Barclay, and Franks’s Stimuli

1 Inference – Acquisition
2 Inference – Recognition
3 Non-inference – Acquisition
4 Non-inference – Recognition

Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam
beneath them.
Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam
beneath it.
Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish
swam beneath them.
Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish
swam beneath it.

Bransford et al. (1972) discovered that participants were not able to distinguish
between sentences that were read during the acquisition phase and those that were first
read during the recognition phase when such sentences involved an inference. As an
example, Bransford et al. employed sentence one in Table 1. The inference in the
sentence is that the fish also swam below the log. When the sentence was presented to
participants during the recognition phase, the pronoun ‘them’ was replaced with the
pronoun ‘it’ as shown in Table 1’s sentence two. Participants mistakenly judged that they
heard the new sentence during the acquisition phase: Participants were confusing new
inference sentences in the recognition phase with sentences in the acquisition phase. By
contrast, sentence three in Table 1 exemplified a non-inference sentence. The difference
between the inference and non-inference sentence revolves around the use of the word
‘beside’ instead of ‘on.’ When participants were tested on the non-inference sentence but
with the pronoun ‘them’ replaced with the pronoun ‘it’ as shown in Table 1 sentence
four, participants did recognize that the new sentence was different from the sentence
learned in acquisition. Given the proposition ‘beside’ in the non-inference sentence, the
inference that the fish also swam beneath the log is not justified.
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Bransford et al. (1972) concluded that people make inferences and these
inferences are hard to distinguish from what was read. Unfortunately, their method does
not allow us to determine when the inferences were made. The separation of the
acquisition and recognition of sentences does not permit a determination of when
participants made the inference. Participants could have made the inference at encoding
or at test. Also, Bransford et al. found that participants could not distinguish between read
and inferred information, a mental image is not the only explanation of this result.
Bransford et al. distinguished between inferences based solely on the text base (linguistic
input) of the sentence and a possible mental image visualized from of the text base.
Bransford et al. stated that images may well hold more information than the linguistic
inputs that created the image but that image would still need to be interpreted in some
way. In other words, a possible mental image still needs to be inspected when inferences
are drawn from it. Bransford et al. concluded that linguistic inputs are insufficient by
themselves to adequately determine what participants have available to them.
Other investigators have explored the time course of inferences: are they made at
the time of encoding or at a later time? Lea (1995) used a lexical decision task to examine
the timing of elaborative inferences. Elaborative inferences, as defined by Anderson
(2000), are inferences that require information from long term memory to make
connections in the material being comprehended, as shown in the passage below. Lea
looked at elaborative inferences where one of two possibilities were presented in the text
but the true possibility was revealed later on. Participants were shown three sentences
that formed a short narrative that presented a character with one of two options:
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Paula was getting dressed for work and asked her roommate, Donna, if she knew
what the weather would be. “I heard it on the news last night and it didn’t sound
good,” said Donna, “they said it would either be rainy or they said it would be
cold – I can’t remember which.” “Hmm, those are two very different dressing
conditions,” Paula thought to herself, “I wish she could remember which it was”
(Lea, 1995, pp. 1481).
Participants were then shown one of two types of sentences. The first type of
sentence was an inference sentence where one of the options from the narrative was
eliminated from the character’s available choices. For this example, the inference
sentence would be “Ok I just called the weather,” shouted Donna, “and it’s not going to
rain” (Lea, 1995, pp. 1481). The other type of sentence does not eliminate one of the two
options and is referred to as a no-inference sentence. Continuing with this example, the
no inference sentence is “Well, whatever happens, I hope I don’t get caught in the rain”
(Lea, 1995, pp. 1481). Each of the four sentences was shown one at a time.
After reading the sentences, participants completed a lexical decision task. The
word in the lexical decision task contained the character’s option from the narrative that
was not eliminated by the inference sentence for the narrative. In the example, the
weather could be rainy or cold. In the inference condition, the option of rainy was
eliminated by the last sentence. This left only the option of cold available. In the no
inference condition, the option of rainy was not eliminated. Response times were based
on the participant’s reaction time to determine if ‘cold’ was a word. Then the final task
for each set of sentences was to verify a statement about the four sentences.
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Response times for the lexical decision task after inference sentences were on
average 63 ms faster than after no inference sentences (p < .01) (Lea, 1995). This study
shows that when one possible option is eliminated the other option is primed. Lea states
that the priming is a sign of the elaborative inference being made while the sentences are
being read. Lea eliminated simple lexical priming as the source of the effect because the
target word appears in the same location in both stories. Further, the lexical decision
word does not appear in the final sentence and a filler sentence falls between the final
sentence and the sentence where the two options appear. The concept of ‘cold’ is not
needed to better understand the final sentence regardless of condition. The faster response
time after the inference sentence appears to be due to readers making an elaborative
inference about the situation the text is describing at the time of reading.
Pronominal inferences have also been shown to be made during fluent reading
(Corbett & Chang, 1983; Ehrlich, K., & Rayner, K., 1983). A pronominal inference
requires people to determine the referent of a pronoun in a sentence or passage. Consider
this simple example: “A ball rolled off a table. It bounced.” Does the ‘it’ refer to the ball,
or to the table? Because there are two possible referents, readers must decide which one
the ‘it’ refers to.
To determine the timing of when pronominal inferences are made, Corbett and
Chang (1983) asked participants to read a sentence and measured the reaction time for
participants to determine whether a probe appeared in the sentence or not. Pronouns in
the sentence facilitated recognition of objects that the pronoun might possibly refer to in
the sentence and not just the object that the pronoun did refer to in the sentence.
Recognition times were fastest for objects the pronoun referred to, but recognition times
6

for objects the pronoun might possibly refer to were faster than objects not in the
sentence.
Curiously, the recognition time for an object that was explicitly mentioned in the
sentence’s predicate was faster than the same object referenced by a pronoun in the
predicate. Due to the time advantage for explicitly stated second clause subjects and
potential pronoun antecedents, the Corbett and Chang study shows that pronominal
inferences are perhaps not made concurrently with ongoing reading activities.
Pronominal inferences do require a small amount of time to be made. Yet the slight delay
in reading needed to make a pronominal inference suggests these inferences may be
considered to be made on-line during the stream of linguistic processing just like the
elaborative inferences Lea used.
A different paradigm that has proven successful in determining the timing of
inference formation is an inference validation task. Clark and Chase (1972) introduced
this paradigm to determine whether inferences are made immediately or at the time of
testing. Clark and Chase presented a picture, such as a star above a plus, to participants.
Participants then had to validate one of four types of statements: true affirmative, false
affirmative, true negative, or false negative. A true affirmative stated exactly what was in
the picture. For our example a true affirmative would be ‘the star is above the plus.’ A
false affirmative stated something incorrect about the picture such as ‘the plus is above
the star.’ A true negative was a correct statement about the picture but used a ‘not.’ ‘The
plus is not above the star’ would be a true negative for our example. Finally, a false
negative was an incorrect statement that used a negative such as ‘the star is not above the
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plus.’ Clark and Chase measured the time participants took to validate each of these types
of statements.
The true affirmative was fastest for participants to validate, which will be referred
to as the baseline. False affirmatives took longer to refute than baseline. The mismatch
between the picture stimulus and the false affirmative statement forced participants to
take more time to process the statement before they could respond. The false negative
also took longer than baseline. The increase in time for the false negative arises due to the
requirement to process the negative wording in the statement. The true negative combines
both a mismatch between the stimulus and the statement and a negation. Both the
mismatch and negation combine to give the true negation statement the longest validation
time for participants.
If all four types of tested inferences were made at encoding, we would predict all
response times would be equal. Since the response times differed among all four groups,
the implication is that not all of the inferences were made during encoding. Instead,
several of the inferences were made during testing. While Clark and Chase (1972) found
an additive increase in verbal verification of pictorial stimuli relationships the same time
increases may also appear in verbal to verbal verification relationships.
Clark and Chase (1972) found that if a mismatch existed between the pictorial
stimulus and the verbal statement to verify, participants required additional time to verify
the statement compared to situations where no mismatch existed. Kintsch’s (1998)
example of a transitive inference contains a relational mismatch which may be a
reciprocal inference. A relational mismatch includes the stimulus containing one type of
relationship (such as above) and the reciprocal inference containing a different or inverse
8

relationship (such as below). Again, consider the sentence from Bransford et al. (1972)
‘Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them,’ the inference given
by Kintsch is ‘The turtles are above the fish.’ Kintsch calls the inference a transitive
inference but the inference is more similar to a reciprocal inference. A reciprocal
inference involves making the inference ‘star above plus’ implies ‘plus below star. If
Clark and Chase’s finding, that a mismatch between a picture stimulus and a verbal
verification requires more time than no mismatch, holds true for verbal stimuli a verbal
verification of a reciprocal inference may also take longer to validate than a transitive
inference. If verbal verification for reciprocal inferences take longer than transitive
inferences, one possible factor is the relational mismatch between the transitive inference
and the verbal stimulus.
If reciprocal inferences are equivalent in processes to transitive inferences as
Kintsch (1998) suggests, behavioral data for validating both kinds of inferences should be
insignificantly different. Several studies have examined transitive inferences but not
reciprocal inferences nor their comparative time frames including studies by Favrel and
Barrouillet (2000). Transitive inferences expand upon stated relationships to infer new
relations. An example of a transitive inference: knowing A > B and B > C then the
inference can be made that A > C.
Transitive inferences may be presented in either a linearly ordered style or a setinclusion style. A linearly ordered transitive inference follows the pattern: if A > B and B
> C then (the inference) A > C. Set inclusion transitive inferences are presented so that a
group of items has a relation with one other item or another group of items. Instead of
presenting one item’s relation to only one other item as in the linearly ordered
9

presentation, set inclusion requires item-by-item relations to be parsed from the group
memberships presented. An example of a set inclusion stimulus would be: All gray bars
are hollow, all bent bars are long, and all hollows bars are bent. Two set inclusion
inferences can be made from these sentences: all gray bars are bent and all gray bars are
long (Favrel & Barrouillet, 2000).
Favrel and Barrouillet (2000) investigated transitive inferences that involved set
inclusion. Using set inclusion stimuli, participants were instructed to learn four sets of
stimuli well enough to judge the validity of subsequent conclusions about the stimuli.
After the acquisition phase, participants saw a random selection of ten valid and ten
invalid inferences from the stimuli. Participants pressed a computer key to indicate
whether the inferences were true or false. Inferences were shown one at time.
Favrel and Barrouillet (2000) found transitive inferences involving set inclusion
stimuli required more time for each additional step that is required for the inference.
Using the bars example, a one-step inference would be all gray bars are bent. An example
of a two-step inference would be all gray bars are long. The more relations that a
participant has to follow before being able to validate an inference the longer the
participant takes to make the transitive inference. This suggests that transitive inferences
based on set inclusion stimuli are made during testing.
Favrel and Barrouillet’s (2000) finding that set inclusion transitive inferences are
made at time of test (rather than in an automatic and on-line way) contradicts Kintsch’s
(1998) assertion about transitive inferences being automatic and occurring during
encoding. One way to reconcile this empirical result with Kintsch’s claim about the
immediacy of transitive inferences would be to consider the possibility that set inclusion
10

stimuli do not lend themselves to an image-based representation. Perhaps Kintsch might
argue that set relationships tend not to facilitate a spatial representation of the
relationships. Without an image to use as the basis of the transitive inference, the
inferences are not automatic.
Clark and Chase’s (1972) experimental paradigm may help to determine when
transitive inferences are made: Asking participants to verify an inference statement
immediately after reading the source sentence may shed light on when transitive
inferences are made. Assume that participants read a sentence and are then immediately
asked to verify a second sentence against the first. One verification item would be a noninference control. Using the sentence ‘The redwood tree grew taller than the maple which
grew taller than the oak,’ as the first sentence, the non-inference control would be ‘The
redwood grew taller than the maple’ because no inference is required for this situation. A
transitive verification item would be ‘The redwood grew taller than the oak.’ If the two
verification times are identical, it suggests the inference was made during encoding while
a longer verification time for the transitive sentences suggests the inference had to be
made when the verification sentence was presented. A reciprocal verification item would
be ‘The oak grew shorter than the redwood.’ Clark and Chase’s results suggest that the
reciprocal verification would take longer than the non-inference verification since there is
a mismatch between the first sentence and the verification sentence. If transitive or
reciprocal inferences take longer to validate than a ‘true affirmative’ the inferences may
not be created during encoding but at the time of verification.
In summary, Kintsch (1998) predicts that transitive and reciprocal inferences are
automatic and occur during encoding. Research on set-inclusion stimuli does not support
11

Kintsch claim about reciprocal inferences. However, stimuli that could be easily
visualized may support his claim. To investigate reciprocal inferences, Clark and Chase’s
(1972) pictorial and verbal verification statement paradigm may be modified to include
verbal stimuli and compared responses times required to validate reciprocal and transitive
inferences. Kintsch predicts that transitive and reciprocal inferences should have the same
accuracy and accuracy rating. On the other hand, Clark and Chase predict that reciprocal
inferences will require additional processing at test due to a verbal mismatch between
stimulus and statement to be validated.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 explored the time needed to validate a transitive inference, a
reciprocal inference, and a true affirmative. All stimuli were based on spatial
relationships such as ‘Bill is taller than Steve and Steve is taller than Sam.’ If Kintsch
(1998) is correct, we should expect direct verification, transitive inferences, and
reciprocal inferences to all have the same verification time and accuracy. If the results of
Chase and Clark (1972) apply to purely linguistic stimuli, we should expect reciprocal
inferences to require more time to validate than affirmative statements. Chase and Clark’s
experiment is not directly related to this one, so how transitive inferences validation
speed compares to affirmative and reciprocal inference validation speeds is not obvious.
If transitive inference validations require any additional processing over affirmative
statement validations, the expected pattern for validation speed should be affirmative
statement validations are faster than transitive inference validations which are faster than
reciprocal inference validations.
While creating the stimuli, a curious feature of Bransford, Barclay, and Franks
(1972) stimuli was noted: Their sentence about the turtles, log, and fish contained two
different relational terms. The turtles were on the logs while the fish swam beneath
them. Other stimuli, such as “Bill is taller than Steve and Steve is taller than Sam”
include only a single relational term “taller.” This suggested a second variable for
13

investigation. The second variable consists of the way the relationships are stated in the
stimulus. The aforementioned taller than sentence will be called a mononymic sentence
because it uses the same comparator for both clauses (e.g. ‘taller than’). The taller than
sentence could be rewritten with a term and its’ antonym: ‘Bill is taller than Steve, but
Sam is shorter than Steve.’ The two sentences express the same relationships but the
reciprocal relationship of ‘shorter than’ is explicitly stated in sentences we term
antonymic. The antonymic sentences explicitly state both a relationship and its inverse.
Reading both types of relationships may speed up participants’ response times when
validating reciprocal inferences, because the antonym that appears in the validation
statement has been primed by the sentence. Another potential effect from the antonymic
sentences is that they may necessitate longer reading times than mononymic sentences
because the participant will have to read both a relationship and its antonym.
The overall within-participant variables for Experiment 1 was a 3 (transitive,
reciprocal, or affirmative) x 2 (true or false) x 2 (mononymic/antonymic stimulus) design.
Method
Participants
144 undergraduate students from Mississippi State University were recruited
through an online experiment participant system. Participants were compensated at least
one-half course credit. Due to the reliance on facile English comprehension, students
whose first language was not English were excluded from the experiment.
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Materials
“Amy can run faster than Susan who can run faster than Barbara” is one of the 24
sentential stimuli created for the experiment that permit an inference to be constructed
(Appendix C). Each sentence had six types of validation statements: true transitive
inference, true reciprocal inference, true affirmative, false transitive inference, false
reciprocal inference, and false affirmative (Table 2). Additionally, 12 filler sentences
were created where no inference was required. One filler sentence was used as a
manipulation check to make sure participants were paying attention to the stimuli and
was placed halfway through the experiment. The manipulation check consisted of the
experimental sentence “A yard is longer than a foot which is longer than an inch.” The
validation statements associated with the manipulation check varied in the same way as
the other experimental sentences but participants should easily judge the validation
statements correctly. Ten participants were excluded from the analysis due to incorrectly
answering the manipulation check.
Table 2

Example of Types of Inferences and Affirmative Statements for the

Experimental Sentence “Ann Can Run Faster than Susan Who Can Run Faster than
Barbra.”
True transitive
True reciprocal
True affirmative
False transitive
False reciprocal
False affirmative

Ann can run faster than Barbra.
Barbra runs slower than Ann.
Ann can run faster than Susan.
Ann runs slower than Barbra.
Barbra can run faster than Ann.
Ann runs slower than Susan.

Procedure
After agreeing to participate in the experiment, participants were instructed to
read each experimental sentence carefully so they could determine whether the following
15

validation statement was true or false. Each trial began with participants reading an
experimental sentence and then responding as quickly as possible to a validation
statement, which may require an inference. Participants were further instructed to press
the space bar after reading the experimental sentence. Once they pressed the space bar,
the experimental sentence was immediately replaced by the validation statement.
Participants were trained to press the ‘j’ key if the validation statement is true or press the
‘f’ key if the statement is false. The type of validation statement for each sentence was
random but each participant responded to each type of validation statement on four trials.
Every participant read the experimental sentences in the same order.
Results and Discussion
Dependent variables included: time required for the participant to judge an
inference as true or false (response time), time required to read the experimental sentence
(reading time), the sum of the reading and the response times (total time), and accuracy.
Items where the response was incorrect were excluded from all response time analyses.
A mixed-models analysis was employed for each dependent variable. The mixed
model included the following fixed effects: the type of inference being inferred; whether
the validation statement was true or false in relation to the stimulus; and whether the
stimulus had only one type or two types of comparisons. The fixed effects were grouped
by participant ID number to allow individual participants to have random intercepts. Each
participant was allowed a random slope for each fixed effect as well. Interactions
between the different effects were analyzed as fixed effects. Due to a technical error,
none of the reading times for the false validation statements were collected. Thus, the
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analyses performed on the reading and total times only include data for true and correctly
judged validation statements.
Reading times were analyzed first. Only two different kinds of experimental
sentences, mononymic and antonymic, were included in the design. If participants spent
more time reading the antonymic statements over the mononymic statements, the
implication would be that additional processing was occurring during encoding. Mean
reading times (and standard errors of the mean) for the different sentence types are shown
in Table 3. While antonymic statements took 50 ms longer to read than mononymic
statements, the difference was not significant (p = 0.88).
Table 3

Experiment 1 Reading Time Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Mononymic and Antonymic Statements
Type of Statement Mean Time SEM Time
Mononymic

8633 msec

183 msec

Antonymic

8683 msec

198 msec

Next, accuracy in determining the validity of an inference was analyzed.
Although reaction times are the primary dependent variable, the possibility exists of a
speed/accuracy tradeoff. Participants were instructed to answer questions correctly, but
may have fallen short of that ideal. As shown in Table 4, affirmative statements had the
highest level of accuracy while reciprocal inferences had the lowest level of accuracy.
This pattern of results suggests that affirmative statements are the easiest, and therefore
the most accurate, statements to validate.
17

Table 4

Experiment 1 Accuracy Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Types of Inferences
Type of Inference Mean Accuracy SEM Accuracy
Affirmative

0.88

0.01

Transitive

0.84

0.01

Reciprocal

0.79

0.01

Overall

0.83

0.01

The mixed model statistical test for participants’ accuracy in correctly judging the
validity of an inference is shown in Table 5. Graphs and an interpretation of the
significant contrasts follow the discussion of the statistical model. All main factors (type
of inference, true or false inference, and number of comparisons in the stimulus), were
significant along with the interactions of type of inference × whether the inference was
true or false and type of inference × mononymic/antonymic stimulus. Specifically, for the
interactions between both the type of inference × whether the inference was true or false
and the type of inference × mononymic/antonymic stimulus, the contrast of the
affirmative and transitive inferences did not differ significantly, but the contrast of the
affirmative and reciprocal inferences did differ significantly.
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Table 5

Experiment 1 Accuracy Mixed Model

Random Effects
Subjects (Intercept)
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
True or False Inference
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Fixed Effects
b
Intercept
2.6227
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
-0.6482
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
-1.3329
True or False Inference
-0.5357
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
-0.4263
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences × True 0.3926
or False Inference
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.5678
True or False Inference
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.1975
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.7230
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement

SEb
0.2198
0.2693
0.2605
0.2177
0.2117
0.2752

Variance
0.3207
0.0341
0.3823
0.2870
0.0943
Wald z
11.934
-2.407
-5.117
-2.461
-2.013
1.426

Std. Dev.
0.5663
0.1846
06183
0.5357
0.3071
p
p < .001
p = .016
p < .001
p = .014
p = .044
p = .154

0.2678 2.118

p = .034

0.2699 0.731

p = .464

0.2677 2.070

p = .007

In Figure 1, we see that accuracy declined from affirmative to transitive to
reciprocal inferences. In the case of affirmative and transitive sentences, accuracy was
superior for true over false sentences. However, accuracy was equivalent for reciprocal
true and false statements, generating the significant interaction between type of inference
and true/false verification.
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Type of Inference * True or False - Accuracy
(with SEM bars)
1.00
.95

Accuracy Percentage

.90
.85
.80
.75
.70
.65
.60
.55
.50
True

False
Affirmative

True

False
Transitive

True

False
Reciprocal

Figure 1.
Experiment 1 mean accuracy scores for true and false validation
statements in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal sentence conditions with standard
error of the mean error bars
Reciprocal inferences having the lowest accuracy among the validation statements
supports the differential processing of transitive and reciprocal inferences. The difference
in error suggests that distinct processes are employed as readers encounter the different
inferential sentences. Another possibility is that the concurrent demands of making
inferences reduces the resources available for understanding. As the complexity of the
inferences increases, the level of understanding may suffer as a result. The finding that
transitive inferences have a lower overall validation accuracy than affirmative statements
hints at concurrent demands reducing understanding.
If validation times follow the inverse pattern as accuracy, participants may have
been engaged in a speed/accuracy tradeoff. However, if the response time trend were in
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the same direction as the accuracy trend, this would strengthen the support for the
conclusion that additional inferential processes are needed at the time of test for the
progressively more complex validations.
The accuracy ratings for mononymic and antonymic stimuli in the three
verification conditions are shown in Figure 2. For both the affirmative statements and
transitive statements, mononymic statements lead to more accurate performance than
antonymic statements; with reciprocal inferences this pattern is reversed, likely the source
of the interaction. A possible explanation for this interaction is that the antonymic
sentences semantically primed the inverse relationship whereas the mononymic sentences
did not.
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Type of Inference * Mononymic/Antonymic Statement Accuracy (with SEM bars)
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Figure 2.
Experiment 1 mean accuracy scores for mononymic and antonymic
sentences in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal sentence conditions with standard
error of the mean error bars

Turning to reaction time data, Table 6 shows the average response times required
to validate the different types of inferences. Reciprocal inferences require almost a full
half a second longer to validate overall than either affirmative statements or transitive
inferences. Affirmative statements and transitive inferences require approximately the
same amount of time to validate. Affirmative statements are not inferences since
participants are confirming what was read in the stimulus and therefore represent a noinference control condition.
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Table 6

Experiment 1 Response Time Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Types of Inferences
Type of Inference Mean RT

SEM RT

Affirmative

3.55 seconds 0.06

Transitive

3.54 seconds 0.07

Reciprocal

3.99 seconds 0.10

Overall

3.68 seconds 0.05

The mixed model analysis of reaction times was only performed on correct
responses. Incorrect responses were excluded from the mixed model analysis of reaction
times, as they reflect inadequate processing of the material. Table 7 shows estimated
coefficients and p values from this model. The type of inference and
mononymic/antonymic stimulus comparisons significantly predicted response time; the
interaction between these two variables was significant as well. Affirmative statements
and transitive inferences had no statistical difference in time required to validate but both
were significantly faster than reciprocal inferences. Unlike the accuracy mixed model
found in Table 5, the interaction with mononymic/antonymic stimulus comparisons and
types of inferences was significant between affirmative and transitive inferences, but the
interaction was not significant between affirmative and reciprocal inferences. Table
7Figure 3 shows a pattern where antonymic sentences were faster than mononymic
sentences only for affirmative and reciprocal judgments, but not transitive ones. The main
effect of whether the inference was true or false and all other interactions failed to reach
significance.
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Table 7

Experiment 1 Response Times Mixed Model

Random Effects
Subjects (Intercept)
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
True or False Inference
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Fixed Effects
b
Intercept
3.673
Affirmative vs Transitive Inferences
-0.220
Affirmative vs Reciprocal Inferences
0.428
True or False Inference
0.119
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
-0.380
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.413
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.031
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement

SEb
0.124
0.148
0.161
0.087
0.141
0.202

Variance
0.5525
0.2723
0.6321
0.1012
0.0291
Wald z
29.691
-1.486
2.668
1.371
-2.690
2.047

Std. Dev.
0.7433
0.5218
0.7950
0.3182
0.1706
p
p < .001
p = .138
p = .008
p = .171
p = .007
p = .041

0.207

0.151

p = .880

Type of Inference * Mononymic/Antonymic
Statement - RT (with SEM bars)
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
Mononymic

Antonymic

Affirmative

Mononymic

Antonymic

Transitive

Mononymic

Antonymic

Reciprocal

Figure 3.
Experiment 1 response time means for mononymic and antonymic
sentences in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal sentence conditions with standard
error of the mean error bars
From Table 6 we see that transitive inferences are verified just as quickly as
affirmative statements. These results suggest that Kintsch is correct that transitive
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inferences are made during reading. The small decline in accuracy for transitive
inferences suggests some differences in processing, a point to be discussed later.
Reciprocal inferences require roughly half a second more time than the
affirmative statements and transitive inferences (Table 6). The extra time required to
judge reciprocal inferences implicates an extra process to judge reciprocal inferences.
Additionally, response times for reciprocal inferences varies with the mononymic or
antonymic nature of the stimulus but response times for transitive inferences do not. The
implication is that reciprocal inferences are not being made online and are a distinct type
of inference.
Looking at the mean response times across types of comparisons in experimental
sentences, validating inferences for antonymic stimuli are made more quickly than
inferences for mononymic stimuli in both the affirmative and reciprocal inference
conditions but not the transitive inference condition (Figure 3). As a reminder,
mononymic statements have the form A < B, B < C while antonymic statements have the
form A < B, C > B. Given that reading times were not different for these two types of
stimuli, the faster reaction times to antonymic statements is surprising and lacks an
obvious explanation.
In summary, Experiment 1 shows that transitive inferences are made during
encoding but reciprocal inferences are evidently made after encoding (Table 6). The
delay in validating reciprocal inferences points to reciprocal inferences requiring
additional processes over typical transitive inferences. The extra 500ms response time for
reciprocal inferences implicates additional processes firing. Anderson’s (2009) ACT-R
cognitive architecture requires 50ms for a mental process to fire. This bottleneck implies
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that ten or fewer additional processes may fire for reciprocal inferences that transitive
inferences do not require. The additional processes may also help explain the lower
accuracy for the reciprocal inferences.
Experiment 1 shows that the processing time required to validate transitive
inferences and affirmative statements are equivalent, while reciprocal inferences are 500
msec slower. This shows that reciprocal inferences require more processes to validate
than transitive inferences indicating they are distinct from one another. In other words,
reciprocal inferences do not fall into the same category as transitive inferences as Kintsch
(1998) claims. Yet, Experiment 1 does not specifically address a second part of Kintsch’s
claim: that transitive inferences are made by reference to a mental image. Experiment 2
investigates the possibility of an image-based representation by employing both spatial
and abstract comparisons, which should affect the ability of participants to utilize mental
images as the basis for transitive inferences.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1’s experimental sentences utilized concrete comparators (“taller
than,” “above,” etc.) that lend themselves naturally to a mental image. However, we can
express comparative relationships with more abstract terms as well e.g. honor,
dependability, etc. If Kintsch is correct in that a mental image is used for inferences,
abstract comparisons that do not readily generate a mental image should take longer to
validate than concrete comparisons. Alternatively, if a mental image is not the basis for
transitive inferences, both spatial and abstract relationships should produce a similar
pattern of performance.
Assuming Kintsch’s image-based representation is correct, we would predict
abstract relationships to take longer to validate than spatial relationships. Sentences that
described spatial relationships would facilitate image formation thus allowing automatic
processes to ‘read’ the image. Abstract relationships which lack a mental image would
require logical reasoning for the inference. The logical reasoning process would
necessitate controlled processing to interpret the imageless description of the abstract
relationship. Unfortunately, past research on transitive inferences has not distinguished
between these two variations. Also, as mentioned previously, experimental paradigms
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that introduce delays between encoding and testing cannot be used to determine when the
inference was made.
Examples of abstract relationships capable of linear ordering include wealth, age,
and difficulty of reading material. If spatial transitive inferences are made faster than
abstract transitive inferences these inferences may indeed be formed as pictures on-line.
On the other hand, if these two inferences are made in an equivalent amount of time a
mental image may not be needed for transitive inferences to be made.
Experiment 2 focused on the time difference needed for transitive inferences to be
validated for spatial and abstract relationships. As in Experiment 1, validation statements
included true transitive inferences, true reciprocal inferences, false transitive and false
reciprocal inferences, and true and false affirmatives. The overall within-participant
design for Experiment 2 was a 3 (transitive, reciprocal, or affirmative) x 2 (abstract or
spatial relationship) x 2 (true or false) x 2 (mononymic/antonymic stimulus) design.
Method
Participants
The same population and exclusion criteria from Experiment 1 were used in
Experiment 2. An additional requirement for Experiment 2 was that students did not
participate in Experiment 1. Some materials from Experiment 1 were reused and
participants should not have any familiarity with the materials of the experiment. A total
of 109 participants completed Experiment 2.
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Materials
An additional twenty-four stimulus sets containing abstract relationships were
create to supplement the existing 24 concrete stimulus sets from Exp. 1 (Appendix D). As
in Experiment 1, each sentence had six types of validation statements: true transitive
inference, true reciprocal inference, false transitive inference, false reciprocal inference,
true affirmative, and false affirmative. Again, consistent with Experiment 1, 24 filler
sentences were created and one was used as a manipulation check. Five participants’ data
was excluded from the data analysis due to incorrectly answering the manipulation check.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 followed the procedures for Experiment 1. In the
current experiment, participants read 72 sentences/probe pairs.
Results and Discussion
Data were analyzed using the same type of Mixed Model analysis as Experiment
1. Accuracy scores and response times mixed models included 104 participants.
Mean accuracy scores were similar to the mean accuracy scores in Experiment 1
(Table 8). Mean accuracy for reciprocal inferences was the lowest accuracy for all types
of inferences. Unlike Experiment 1, affirmative statements and transitive inferences had
the same level of accuracy.
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Table 8

Experiment 2 Accuracy Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Types of Inferences
Type of Inference Mean Accuracy SEM Accuracy
Affirmative

0.82

0.01

Transitive

0.82

0.01

Reciprocal

0.77

0.01

Overall

0.81

0.01

Accuracy between inferences from experimental sentences that used spatial or
abstract relationships was close (Table 9).
Table 9

Experiment 2 Accuracy Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Spatial and Abstract Relationships.
Type of Relationship Mean Accuracy SEM Accuracy
Spatial

0.81

0.01

Abstract

0.80

0.01

Overall

0.81

0.01

Table 10 shows the accuracy mixed model factors for Experiment 2. The model
for the current experiment had all of the same significant factors from the previous
experiment but also added one new significant factor: the interaction with true or false
inferences and the types of inference between affirmative and transitive.
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The accuracy of spatial and abstract stimuli was found to be statistically
equivalent. No difference was found between different mononymic and antonymic
stimuli. The lack of accuracy differences, by themselves, do not lead to a necessary
conclusion that abstract & spatial or mononymic & antonymic stimuli are processed in
the same way, but these equivalencies rule out the complication of speed/accuracy
tradeoffs in such cognitive processes.
Table 10

Experiment 2 Accuracy Mixed Model

Random Effects
Subjects (Intercept)
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
True or False Inference
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
Fixed Effects
b
Intercept
3.0237
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
-0.9266
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
-1.6367
True or False Inference
-1.4564
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
-0.5871
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
-0.0519
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
1.2066
True or False Inference
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
1.6600
True or False Inference
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.2344
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.5753
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement

SEb
0.2087
0.2182
0.2109
0.1860
0.1598
0.0877
0.2127

Variance
1.1485
0.2181
0.2911
0.7249
0.2453
0.0696
Wald z
14.487
-4.246
-7.763
-7.830
-3.674
-0.592
5.672

Std. Dev.
1.0717
0.4670
0.5395
0.8514
0.8514
0.2638
p
p < .001
p < .001
p < .001
p < .001
p < .001
p = .554
p < .001

0.2080

7.981

p < .001

0.2032

1.154

p = .249

0.1968

2.924

p = .003

Figure 4 shows the interaction of accuracy scores by the type of inference and
mononymic/antonymic statement. Both affirmative and transitive inferences had a higher
accuracy with mononymic statements. Reciprocal inferences had relatively the same level
of accuracy with both mononymic and antonymic statements.
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Type of Inference * Mononymic/Antonymic Statement Accuracy (with SEM bars)
Accuracy Percentage
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Figure 4.
Experiment 2 mean accuracy scores for mononymic and antonymic
sentences in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal sentence conditions with standard
error of the mean error bars
Figure 5 shows the interaction of accuracy scores by the type of inference and
validity of the inference. True statements were more accurate than false for both the
affirmative and transitive statements but equivalent for reciprocal statements. The
interaction again appears as a diminishing difference between true and false from
affirmative statements to transitive inferences and reciprocal inferences.
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Accuracy Percentage

Type of Inference * True/False Accuracy (with SEM bars)
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Figure 5.
Experiment 2 mean accuracy scores for true and false validation
statements in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal sentence conditions with standard
error of the mean error bars
In terms of accuracy scores, the spatial or abstract nature of the stimuli did not
have an effect.
Transitioning to response times, Table 11 shows the mean response times and the
standard error of the mean for the response times for each type of inference. Reciprocal
inferences required the most amount of time to validate. The response time for reciprocal
inferences is not a clear 500 ms more than the other types of inferences as in Experiment
1. Transitive inferences seem to require more time than validating the affirmative in
Experiment 2.
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Table 11

Experiment 2 Response Time Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Types of Inferences.
Type of Inference Mean RT SEM RT
Affirmative

3.16

0.05

Transitive

3.34

0.06

Reciprocal

3.73

0.08

Overall

3.40

0.03

Similar to mean accuracy, the mean response times for spatial and abstract
relationships were close to each other (Table 12).
Table 12

Experiment 2 Response Time Means and Standard Errors of the Means for

Spatial and Abstract Relationships.
Type of Relationship Mean RT SEM RT
Spatial

3.39

0.05

Abstract

3.42

0.05

Overall

3.40

0.04

Only one significant main effect, affirmative statements contrasted with reciprocal
inferences, was found (Table 13). This reinforces the proposition that affirmative
statements and transitive inferences are made during encoding and reciprocal inferences
are made at test. Important to Experiment 2’s purpose, the main effect of spatial/abstract
stimuli was not significant nor did it significantly interact with any other factor. Eliciting
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no significant effect on the model indicates that the spatial or abstract nature of the
stimuli has no effect on participants’ ability to make inferences about the experimental
sentences. This indicates that a mental model was not being utilized to validate the
inferences. No significant difference was found when comparing the response times of
affirmative and transitive inferences (Table 13). Neither was any interaction with this
contrast significant. This indicates that affirmative statements and transitive inferences
are validated at the same time and show the same pattern of response times for
interactions with every other factor in this experiment.
Affirmative statements and reciprocal inferences significantly differed in the time
required to validate them. The time difference between the two was roughly 500 msec
again. Also, affirmative statements and reciprocal inferences differed in their interaction
with true/false inferences in that true reciprocal inferences took longer to validate than
false reciprocal inferences but only with stimuli that contained a mononymic statement
(Table 13Figure 6). On the other hand, affirmative statements took longer to validate only
if the inference was false which was consistent regardless of the mononymic or
antonymic nature of the experimental statement. This partially lines up with Experiment
1’s findings in that reciprocal inferences took roughly half a second longer than the other
types of inferences.

Table 13

Experiment 2 Response Time Mixed Model

Random Effects
Subjects (Intercept)
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
True or False Inference
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Variance
0.7683
0.1013
0.4364
0.0811

Std. Dev.
0.8765
0.3183
0.6606
0.2848

Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
Fixed Effects
b
Intercept
3.1683
Affirmative vs. Transitive Inferences
0.0929
Affirmative vs. Reciprocal Inferences
1.1208
True or False Inference
0.3246
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
-0.1765
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
-0.1663
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
-0.1196
True or False Inference
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
-1.0145
True or False Inference
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.0640
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
-0.6913
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.2346
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.2644
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
True or False Inference ×
-0.1035
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
True or False Inference × Spatial or
-0.0189
Abstract Stimuli
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement ×
0.1178
Spatial or Abstract Stimuli
Affirmative & Transitive Inferences ×
0.0323
True or False Inference ×
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement
Affirmative & Reciprocal Inferences ×
0.7357
True or False Inference ×
Mononymic/Antonymic Statement

SEb
0.1516
0.1699
0.1854
0.1671
0.1637
0.1412
0.2143

0.1008
0.1018
Wald z
20.895
0.547
6.045
2.942
-1.078
-1.177
-0.558

0.3175
0.3190
p
p < .001
p = .585
p < .001
p = .052
p = .281
p = .239
p = .577

0.2213

-4.584

p < .001

0.2133

0.300

p = .764

0.2189

-3.158

p = .002

0.1539

1.524

p = .128

0.1565

1.689

p = .091

0.2218

-0.466

p = .641

0.1273

-0.149

p = .882

0.1273

0.925

p = .355

0.3123

0.104

p = .918

0.3185

2.310

p = .021

Figure 6 illustrates the three-way interaction between the type of inference,
mononymic/antonymic statement, and true/false statement. As in Experiment 1,
validating reciprocal inferences took longer than validating affirmative statements and
transitive inferences. This indicates that an addition process is needed for reciprocal
inferences that is not done while the stimulus. Also like in Experiment 1, response times
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for validation statements with mononymic experimental sentences required more time for
reciprocal inferences compared with antonymic experimental sentences. This indicates
that some lexical priming may be occurring which decreases the time needed to validate
these inferences. Unlike Experiment 1, both affirmative and transitive inferences required
roughly the same amount of time to validate no matter the mononymic or antonymic
nature of the experimental sentences. This indicates that potential lexical priming does
not decrease response time. Looking further into whether the validation statement was
true or false, reciprocal inferences required more time to validate for true validation
statements whereas affirmative and transitive inferences required less time. This hints
back to Clark and Chase’s (1972) stimulus/inference mismatch study. Affirmative
statements and transitive inferences more closely match the stimulus sentence than
reciprocal inferences. The closer the inference matches the stimulus, the less time is
required to validate the inference.
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Type of Inference * Mononymic/Antonymic Statement *
True/False - RT (with SEM bars)
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Figure 6.
Experiment 2 response time means for true and false validation statements
and mononymic and antonymic sentences in the affirmative, transitive, and reciprocal
sentence conditions with standard error of the mean error bars
My original prediction for Experiment 2 was that no difference between
inferences based on spatial relationships and inferences based on abstract relationships
exists. Kintsch (1998) would predict contrary differences based on his theory of
inferences utilizing a mental image of the stimulus. Overall, the spatial/abstract split had
no effect on the accuracy nor the responses times of the participants. Since no advantage
exists for the spatial stimuli over the abstract stimuli, a congruent mental image of the
stimulus is not being used. This is counter what Kintsch predicts. Propositions or some
other form of representation that does not rely on a set type medium is being used
instead.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two experiments were conducted to test the nature of transitive and reciprocal
inferences. The manipulations in the experiments included experimental stimuli with one
or two types of comparison operators (mononymic/antonymic), true or false validation
statements, and experimental stimuli with spatial or abstract constructs. Kintsch (1998)
posits that transitive inferences are made during encoding. Part of his claim as to why
transitive inferences are made automatically is that the reader creates a mental image of
what is being read. If a mental image is aiding in the utilization of inferences, reciprocal
inferences should not require more time than transitive inferences and spatial
relationships should require less time than abstract relationships to validate inferences.
However, if reciprocal inferences require more time to validate than transitive inferences,
other processes are occurring other than interpreting an image, as Kintsch suggests. Also,
if the nature of the stimulus does not influence the timing of transitive inferences, a form
other than a mental image is being constructed by the reader.
In both experiments, transitive inferences took the same amount of time to
validate as affirmative statements. However, accuracy ratings differed significantly for
validating transitive inferences and affirmative statements.
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If an image of the relationships were being made, validating affirmative
statements and transitive inferences should have the same accuracy since participants are
referring to a previously created image. Something other than an image is being used in
judging validation statements.
Further evidence that points to something other than an image as the basis for
these judgements is the lower accuracy of judging false affirmative statements. If an
image is all that is being used to judge, false affirmatives should be as accurate as true
affirmatives. What both experiments found is that false affirmative validations had an
accuracy closer to transitive or even reciprocal inference scores.
Reciprocal inferences took longer than both transitive inferences and affirmative
statements, suggesting these inferences are not made during encoding but are instead
triggered when the verification statement appears.
The reciprocal inferences with mononymic stimuli may coincide more with
Kintsch’s (1998) bridging knowledge inference. A bridging knowledge inference, as
defined by Kintsch, is an inference that requires a search through long term memory for a
concept that completes the inference. An example of this is “Dave wanted a new bike; He
got a job as a waiter.” To connect the concepts of job and wanting a bike, the concept of
money must be activated. Earning money at a job allows for the purchase of goods.
Retrieving this concept completes the bridging knowledge inference. The search is not
instantaneous nor automatic. This pattern of response time is consistent with what was
found in the experiments with true reciprocals with mononymic stimuli. A search through
memory for the inverse comparison must be found to enable the inference whereas the
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reciprocal inference with antonymic stimuli has already exposed the reader to the inverse
relationship so the inference can be made at test but without the memory search.
The reason the reciprocal inferences are validated faster for antonymic than
mononymic may be due to lexical priming. Using the relationship of above/below as an
example, mononymic stimuli only have one type of relationship (above). The inverse
relationship (below) has be to found or generated at test. However, for antonymic
sentences, the inverse relationship is primed via the stimulus. Validating reciprocal
inferences may be as fast as validating transitive inferences for antonymic stimuli
because the connection of above and below is activated during reading whereas for
mononymic stimuli the connection must be made manually.
Accuracy data is also consistent with a difference in processing between transitive
and reciprocal inferences. Reciprocal inferences led to consistently lower accuracies than
affirmative and transitive stimuli. If transitive and reciprocal inferences are processed in
the same manner, accuracies would be equivalent.
For future research, rerunning Experiment 2 with more measurements of each
combination of factors will allow for more participants to be included in the data
analysis. Doubling the number of times each participant sees each combination of factors
from two to four will increase the likelihood that each participant will have at least some
data for each combination of factors. Increasing the number of sentences and validation
statements participants see from 72 to 144 may cause fatigue effects during the
experiments. The participants will likely need a break to prevent fatigue which will
significantly extend the amount of time each participant will be in the experiment. The
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benefit will be the ability to use the same number of participants in the accuracy score
and response time analysis.
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APPENDIX A
IRB Application
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Figure A1.

IRB application
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure A1 (continued)
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Figure B1.

IRB Approval Letter
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APPENDIX C
Stimuli for Experiment 1
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Table C1

Experiment 1 Spatial Mononymic Experimental Sentences
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Table C2

Experiment 1 Spatial Antonymic Experimental Sentences
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Table C3

Experiment 1 Filler Sentences and Manipulation Check
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APPENDIX D
Stimuli for Experiment 2
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Table D1

Experiment 2 Spatial Mononymic Experimental Sentences

(continued)
67

(continued)

68

69

Table D2

Experiment 2 Spatial Antonymic Experimental Sentences
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Experiment 2 Filler Sentences and Manipulation Check
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Table D4

Experiment 2 Abstract Mononymic Experimental Sentences
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Table D5

Experiment 2 Abstract Antonymic Experimental Sentences
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